ABSTRACT

This paper deals with study Emergence of Norms in a Society of Heterogeneous Agents Influenced by the Rules of Cellular Automata Techniques.To study the phenomenon of emergence of social norms, we have assumed that the interactions between the agents are private, i.e.; not observable to the other agents not involved in the interactions. We consider a population of agents, where, in each interaction each agent is paired with another agent selected randomly from its neighborhood or from the population in a non-uniform manner. Each agent is learning concurrently over repeated interactions with selected opponents from the society. An agent learns a policy to play the game from repeated interactions with multiple agents. We are particularly interested in finding out if the entire population learns to converge to a consistent norm when multiple action combinations yield the same optimal payoff. In addition to this, we also would like to explore the effects of heterogeneous populations where different agents may be using cellular automata techniques.